The identical agent, identical good Bertrand game is associated with prices at marginal cost -the Bertrand Paradox. If consumers make occasional mistakes I show that the standard Bertrand game gives rise to positive profits and prices above marginal cost. Some firms charge low prices to capture the bulk of the sales while others charge high prices selling to mistaken consumers. Furthermore, with free entry the Diamond Paradox arises; a full measure of the firms choose the monopoly price. As a result, the Diamond Paradox arises in an environment with zero search costs by replacing searching costs with searching errors.
Introduction
It is stated, without much discussion, that the outcome of an identical agent, identical good price competition game (Bertrand game) is pricing at marginal cost. This is known as the Bertrand Paradox. To justify price dispersion and profits one must rely on other mechanisms such as product differentiation, asymmetric costs, or capacity constraints to name a few. In other words, profits and price dispersion arise when firms have the ability to deviate from the requirements of identical agents, identical goods, or price competition.
The goal of this paper is to illustrate that both price dispersion and positive profits can be realized in Bertrand games without such deviations from the primary assumptions. In practice a label is misread, a miscalculation is made, or a consumer simply grabs the wrong product. Consumers may very well buy something other than what is best -a mistake. A small probability of a consumer making a mistake is sufficient to generate profits and price dispersion in the Bertrand game. If there is more than two firms competing in a Bertrand game at least two firms must price at marginal cost so that neither prefers to raise its price. The remaining firms are indifferent between every other price. Consequently, in all Nash equilibrium, every firm earns a zero profit. If there is a possibility that consumers make mistakes, pricing at marginal cost is undesirable. If, with a small probability, a consumer accidentally buys the wrong good, you want to have a greater price.
To model mistakes I assume that each consumer chooses his best response with a probability strictly less than one and buys each of the remaining products with equal likelihood. Thus, a mistake is an exogenous deviation from a best response. The formulation is a simplified version of that found in the refinements and economic evolution literatures (see, for example, Hehenkamp (2002) , Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) , and Young (1993) ). It is important to note that this is not a model of optimal experimentation but rather a model of exogenous errors made by consumers.
Others have derived profits and/or price dispersion in Bertrand games. Baye and Morgan (1999) show that if monopoly profits are infinite then both price dispersion and positive profits occur. Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) derive mixed strategy equilibria with positive profit. Their result requires revenue to be unbounded. Harrington (1989) focuses on finite strategy spaces and shows that there exists an equilibrium where each firm prices at the lowest price strictly above marginal cost. Varian (1980) introduces a set of uninformed consumers who cannot observe prices and show that firms earn positive profits. The result presented here achieves both profits and price dispersion without such assumptions.
I find another interesting result. A fixed cost to entry is added to determine the number of firms in the market. As the cost to entry decreases to zero (free entry) the Diamond Paradox arises. Diamond (1971) showed that if consumers must pay a positive search cost to observe prices then each firm chooses the monopoly price. I find that as the number of firms in the market expands each firm's equilibrium strategy converges to the pure strategy of choosing the competitive price or the pure strategy of choosing the monopoly price. Therefore, in the limit, there exist outcomes where all firms choose a price equal to marginal cost (Bertrand Paradox) as well as equilibria outcomes where a full measure of firms choose the monopoly price.
Thus, the Diamond Paradox occurs in an environment with no search costs by replacing them with searching errors.
The paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2 deriving the equilibrium when there are two, three, and N firms competing in the market. Section 3 discusses entry into the market. Section 4 concludes.
The Model
There are N firms who each produce identical products at a constant marginal cost c > 0. There exists a continuum of consumers with a mass normalized to unity. Each firm simultaneously selects a price p i and then each consumer, observing all prices, chooses a firm from which to buy. A consumer desires, at most, one unit of the indivisible good and may select not to purchase. Firm i earns a profit
where p −i is the vector of prices for all firms except i's and µ i (p i , p −i ) is the number of consumers that buy from i. A consumer receives a utility of
from buying the good produced by Firm i and zero if he chooses not to buy a good. Assume c < V < ∞ so that the requirements in Baye and Morgan (1999) and Kaplan and Wettstein (2000) are not satisfied. I solve for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria.
1
When N = 2 the unique equilibrium outcome is for both firms to price at marginal cost. The equilibrium if the number of firms exceeds two is no longer unique. If two or more firms choose, as a pure strategy, the price c no firm has a profitable deviation. Any price above c results in zero sales while pricing at marginal cost guarantees a zero profit. Hence, any price profile with at least two firms choosing c is an outcome.
2
Consider the following extension to the previous model. Suppose that a consumer chooses to buy from Firm i. With probability 1 − λ ∈ ¡ 1 2 , 1 ¢ he makes no mistake and buys from i. With a probability λ a mistake is made.
For simplicity assume that, conditional on a mistake being made, each of the other products is purchased with equal likelihood. Thus, a mistake is an exogenous probability of selecting something other than a consumer's best 1 It is common to consider only the simultaneous-move game with the assumption that consumers buy the lowest priced good. The subgame perfection refinement guarantees that at no point does the firm with the strictly greater price receive any sales.
2 Harrington (1989) in Theorem 1 gives the complete set of pure and mixed strategy equilibria for N firms. Specifically, any profile where two or more firms choose the pure strategy of p = c and the remaining firms choose any pure or mixed strategy of prices greater than c is a Nash equilibrium.
response. Furthermore, assume that a consumer never purchases a product priced greater than the price V . Hence, V represents both the choke price as well as the monopoly price.
Similar setups occur in other works. Young (1993) uses mistakes as a mechanism to generate the use of conventions. Specifically, player j makes a mistake with probability α j ε. Kandori, Mailath, and Rob (1993) study long run equilibrium in 2x2 games with mutations. They assume that a player chooses his best response with a probability 1 − 2ε and randomizes over the two strategies playing each with probability ε. The model presented here can be thought of as a simplification of these models where mistakes occur only by consumers, occur with the same frequency by all consumers, and are independent of the prices chosen. It is important to note that these two papers use mistakes to restrict the set of outcomes while I use them to expand and generalize the outcomes. Similar assumptions are made in evolutionary games. Hehenkamp (2002) studies an evolutionary model of price competition with consumers who sluggishly learn prices. With a positive probability they randomly select a firm to buy from. Hehenkamp models random learning in the same manner that mistakes occur in this model. This paper is also closely related to models of "informed" and "uninformed" shoppers such as Varian (1980) . Informed shoppers always buy from the low price firm while uninformed shoppers purchase from a randomly assigned firm.
Experimental economics and experimental psychology discusses the pat-terns and implications of individual mistakes. Rubinstein, Meyer, and Evans (2001) discuss outcomes of psychological experiments studying the mental process of task switching. Three experimental outcomes were found, which are relevant to this work: (1) there is a positive number of mistakes (averages range from 4.3% to 8.8%), (2) the error rate is as high as 13.0%, and (3) the error rate is correlated with the time it took people to answer the question and make a decision. Thus, mistakes, even in simple psychological experiments, occur at a relatively frequent rate. The literature on public goods giving acknowledges the importance of mistakes. Prisbey (1996 & 
N = 2
If there are two firms mistakes eliminate all pure strategy equilibria. At prices strictly above marginal cost it is better to undercut the competition.
The pure strategy of pricing at c results in zero profit. By choosing a higher price and relying only on mistakes the expected profit is positive.
Lemma 1 If N = 2 there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Second, there is no pure strategy equilibrium where the firms (p − c).
By choosing any price in (c, V ] a positive expected profit is realized. Since these options exhaust all possible prices there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium.
At prices below c profit is nonpositive. The price V serves as a choke price so that any price greater results in no sales and zero profit. Mistakes allow a firm to generate a positive expected profit even if it selects a higher price than its competitor. Thus, each firm selects prices only in the interval [c, V ] . With mistaken consumers a firm can choose to not engage in the price war that results from the undercutting of prices and instead select a price greater than its competitor selling only to mistaken consumers. Since the probability of a mistake is constant for prices less than V and zero beyond the greatest expected profit a firm can earn if settling for mistaken consumers is at the price V . Hence, a firm can guarantee
selling only to mistaken consumers. As a result, neither firm is willing to choose a price below the one that gives the same payoff when visited first.
Thus, the lower bound on prices in a mixed strategy when there are two firms, denoted p L 2 (with the subscript 2 denoting N = 2), must be the one that gives an equivalent payoff
Solving for the lower bound, firms are never willing to price below
Given this, I now turn attention to the mixed strategy equilibria. Proof. Consider the distribution function is the resulting demand.
Simplifying, it follows that for any value of p ∈ £ p At any price less than c the expected payoff is nonpositive. At prices between c and p L 2 a firm has the lower price with probability one and result in a profit
Hence, neither firm has a profitable deviation making this a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
Therefore, if two firms compete in a Bertrand game and consumers make mistakes, firms earn a positive expected profit, but they play identical strategies and price dispersion is a result of draws from the same distribution.
N > 2
As is the case with two firms, if the number of firms exceeds two there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Lemma 2 If N > 2 there is no pure strategy equilibrium.
Proof. Extending the result from N = 2 to N > 2 replicates the proof of Lemma 1.
As before, any firm can deviate to the monopoly price. If a consumer makes a mistake, it is equally likely that a firm is visited. Thus, the profit from pricing at V is λ N − 1 (V − c) .
As before, the lowest any firm is willing to price is one that gives an equivalent ) . Thus, the lower bound on prices is
With three firms price competition requires that at least two firms compete to be visited first. The other firm may compete as well or settle for selling to mistaken consumers. Two types of equilibria arise. In the first, all three play a symmetric mixed strategy with no mass points. In the second, two firms mix over the common interval with no mass points in their distribution while the other plays a pure strategy choosing the monopoly price. In all equilibria, each firm earns the same positive expected profit. The latter has the additional feature of price dispersion. One firm chooses the monopoly price and the other two firms choose different prices with probability one. Proof. Consider the distribution function
and π 3 = λ 2 (V − c). There exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game where all three firms select prices according to F 3 (p).
Consumer behavior is the similar to that described in the proof of Proposition 1. For any profile of prices (p a , p b , p c ) each consumer prefers the firm with the lowest price. If p a < p b and p c ,
. If b and c are pricing according to F 3 (p) a's expected profit is
Simplifying, it follows that for any value of p ∈ £ p Selecting a price greater than V results in no sales and zero profit. At any price less than c the expected payoff is nonpositive. At prices between c and p L 3 a firm is the lowest price with probability one and result in a profit of
Now consider the distribution function
¤ . An analogous argument illustrates that if two firms are pricing according to F 2 (p) while a third is selecting the pure strategy V then none prefer to deviate making this a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
At least two firms must select low prices near marginal cost. If none did then firms would prefer to undercut the lowest price competitor. If only one firm selects these low prices then it would prefer to increase its price to extract more surplus from the unmistaken consumers. If two firms are competing over low prices a third may compete as well or it may select a greater price and sell to mistaken consumers. If the second option is taken the best choice is to select the monopoly price. Since the expected profit of these two options is identical there are multiple equilibria outcomes. Now consider generalizing the solution to N firms. The same two types of equilibria arise. There always exists equilibria where all firms mix according to the same distribution function over a common support where the lower bound of this support, p L N , is defined in (7). Also, any price profile where two or more firms mix over this support with no mass points and the remaining firms play as a pure strategy the monopoly price is an equilibrium. For notational purposes, divide the N firms into one set of K firms and another set with L firms so that N = K + L. The following proposition outlines the set of Nash equilibria for any number of firms.
Proposition 3 Any price profile where K > 1 firms mix according to
and the L firms choose the pure strategy V is an equilibrium.
Proof. This follows immediately from generalizing the proof of Proposition 2. Consider the distribution function
There exists a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the game where K > 1 firms select prices according to F 3 (p) and the remaining L firms select V .
Consumer behavior is the similar to that in Proposition 2. For any profile p = (p a , p b , ..., p N ) each consumer prefers the firm with the lowest price. If p a < p i ∀i 6 = a, a's profit is (1 − λ) (p a − c) while if there exists a firm where
Simplifying, it follows that for any
Constructing the other K − 1 firms' expected profit it follows that each 
Hence, no firm has a profitable deviation making this a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
As a consequence, each firm earns Furthermore, from (6), as λ decreases to zero each firm's profit falls to zero. Thus, the standard Bertrand game is the special case when λ = 0.
Also, notice in Proposition 3 that as λ decreases to zero the set of Nash equilibria dwindles to only pure strategies with the K firms choosing a price at the marginal cost and the L firms pricing at the monopoly level.
Entry
The above analysis exogenously fixed the number of firms. Since firms are earning positive profits it is natural to consider entry into the market. Suppose there is an unlimited supply of firms willing to enter the market and the fixed cost of entry is x > 0. Firms enter the market until the expected profit is nonpositive. Hence, there is N firms in the market if
Therefore, the equilibrium number of firms is the closest integer less than
As a consequence, more firms enter the market as mistakes are more likely.
Also, to have at least the three firms required for price dispersion, it must be that the probability of an error is greater than Consider the set of equilibria as the costs to entry reduce to zero (free entry). Since the probability of mistakes is positive, profit is bounded above zero. Therefore, every firm enters. As N → ∞ the mixed strategy distribution in Proposition 3 played by the K firms converges to . I use this ratio to measure the number of firms at the monopoly level. In the limit, as the cost to entry decreases to zero, there is an infinite number of firms. Therefore, the set of equilibria outcomes moves to a set that includes outcomes where the ratio L N is zero while the fraction selecting the competitive price is one. Thus, the Bertrand Paradox re-emerges as we move towards free entry. Another interesting outcome of the limit is that, in other equilibria outcomes, this ratio goes to one so that the full measure of the firms choose the monopoly price. Diamond (1971) showed that, in an environment with positive search costs, firms selling identical goods choose the monopoly price. This is known as the Diamond Paradox. Hence, the Diamond Paradox arises with zero search costs.
Conclusion
I present a model of mistakes where consumers play their intended strategy with probability strictly less than one. The equilibrium in the identical agent, identical good Bertrand game exhibits positive expected profits. Furthermore, if there is more than two firms there exist equilibria where at least two firms play a mixed strategy of low prices and the remaining firms select the monopoly price relying only on occasional mistakes made by consumers.
As a consequence, price dispersion exists under price competition. Furthermore, I consider entry into the market. As the entry costs converge to zero there exist outcomes where, in the limit, a full measure of the firms choose the monopoly price. As a consequence, the Diamond Paradox occurs in the limit using searching errors rather than searching costs.
The model lends itself to empirical predictions of markets where firms are pricing to sell to consumers who occasionally make mistakes. First, there should be a few firms making the bulk of the sales. The prices charged should be low but above marginal cost. Second, the remaining firms choose high prices and make few sales. There should be no variance in their price, which is at the monopoly level. Finally, the number of firms is larger when either mistakes occur frequently or the monopoly price level is great. Future work should elaborate on the mistake mechanism. For example, allowing for the frequency of mistakes to be contingent on prices or brand names might add interesting insights to the price dispersion. Finally, firms may adjust
